Module 3
The National Bank: the Federalist Consensus Shatters
Module III:
the National Bank
the Second Act Begins
When Hamilton initially pressed for his national bank, there were only three commercial banks open for business in the entire of the Thirteen Colonies (Bank of North America in Philadelphia (1781), Bank of New York (started in part by Hamilton himself in 1784), and the Massachusetts Bank (1784)). On the threshold of the national debate three more were authorized (Bank of Maryland in Baltimore (1790), the Bank of the United States in Philadelphia (1791), and the Bank of Providence (1791) [3].
Hamilton wasted no time. Two pieces of legislation a whiskey tax (a rehash from 1781 Morris) and the National Bank proposal were sent to Congress almost immediately with its resumption in Philadelphia. We will deal with the former at a later point, but it easily, and quickly was approved–viewed by nearly all as a relatively painless way to raise necessary revenues. Congressman Albert Gallatin and our friend Senator Maclay, both from hinterland constituencies predicted it would generate considerable negative reaction–but what did they know? It should be noted the National Bank, expected since the Public Credit/Residency Act deal, commanded a high priority and consensus among the Federalist Tribe which dominated the Congress a bit less than 2-1. It first passed the Senate on a voice vote; and then formally 10-6 on January 20th. Despite all the noise and the numerous paragraphs to follow, the battle that was waged was in the House of Representatives, and even there its outcome was never seriously in doubt. The real surprise which will unfold in its due time was just that, totally unexpected.
By now, with previous discussion on Robert Morris’s Bank of North America, the reader should assume that a National Bank was regarded as necessary, as an instrument, a vehicle, a national-level EDO, to install and manage a public credit, currency, and finance/governmental fiscal system. Inside the legislation was a proposal to establish a national mint to handle the mechanics of a currency.The bank was reason the great battle over the Public Credit system had been fought, and without the bank that public credit system lacked an administrator. In several key respects, the national bank was an essential component of a more empowered central/national government which had been a chief motivation in the construction of a the new Constitution; interstate commerce, another motivation and tariff and budget administration were also assumed to require a national-level banking vehicle of some type. From an economic development perspective, the national bank, and commercial banks in particular, were the central weight-bearing pillars of a early capitalist economy, and the core institutions that were central to our Mainstream ED (MED) approach to American ED.
So the issue was never really to bank or not to bank; it was what kind of bank, how much of a role did it exercise over other banks at the state level, and who seemed to benefit most from its activities. There was also another subtle factor: how much it was seen as the leading edge of a British-economic system. Britain, it should be kept in mind, was not popular with large segments of the population, and those who voted in the new, low-turnout democracy. A good deal of Hamilton’s report was dedicated to explaining to elites and masses alike just what a commercial bank was, how it did business, and what value it offered. A good part of he debate that followed was as much trying to digest and understand just what this bank “thing” was, and to ensure that latent misgivings were clarified. Today in a world saturated with technology, apps, widgets and the like, we tend to forget that banks were a new form of financial technology to most Americans, elite or masses. Just as the Internet raises privacy issues, the new bank took some adjusting to as it strengthened a government in ways novel and even threatening. To read all this as anti-capitalist is, in my mind, much an overstatement (although there were many anti-capitalists about).
But Hamilton’s national bank was not a pure government EDO, it followed the British model, a hybrid public/private EDO, one of those controversial chartered corporations, this one at the national rather than state level. Its funding was only 20% public governmental, and the remainder came from private investment–selling shares to the “general public”, i.e. those who could afford and were willing to buy its shares, and/or purchase its forthcoming bond issuance. In this sense, Hamilton’s bank from the get-go had two strikes against it. But firmly committed to his conception of a national commercial bank, Hamilton saw that entity/institution “as an invaluable asset to the country; providing a repository for government funds, creating a trustworthy paper currency, servicing the national debt, managing the foreign exchange, and creating a permanent pool of investment capital that would foster economic growth“. He believed the bank would cause the “overall national money supply to expand {which] in turn would stimulate new investment“.
The bank to perform its mission needed to be driven and guided by capitalism’s profit, and supply/demand functions–he saw it as key to private free enterprise, and to achieve that marriage of private and public the bank’s governance had to be insulated from politics, provided limited liability to insure it would not be harassed and constricted by potential legal actions, and the independent board of directors be private individuals, experienced capitalists if you will [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 285. His legislation proposed the bank would be located in Philadelphia, and that would be its permanent location in that Philadelphia was then the nation’s financial capital. Another key strength of the national bank was that it could mitigate the distinctions between hard gold and silver currency–and the controversial exchange rates that followed–by holding its gold and silver assets in a reserve, and issuing paper money backed by these assets. In these respects, Hamilton took his bank steps beyond anything the Bank of North America could offer. Moreover, the National Bank would enjoy a twenty year charter tenure. At the time, this was seen as an eternity.
Another strike that rapidly was apparent was that sectionalism by this point was a serious and dynamic factor in Congressional voting. As regards to the bank, southerners as a grouping were distrustful of a national bank in the hands of northern, anti-slavery Federalists. That slavery as an issue, and northern proto-abolitionism had made a repeated and intensely provocative entry into the previous two sessions, had done more than put southerners on edge. Already fragmented by a sizable Anti-Federalist element (they wanted banking to be contained as much as possible on the state-level) southerners reacted quickly, and intensely to Hamilton’s proposed bank structure. Washington, we might note, was a Tidewater southerner from Virginia.
But Washington, it was assumed with considerable justification, had made his peace with commercial banking. Committed as he was to interstate commerce, internal improvements, DTIS Washington was personally experienced with state-chartered corporations. He had personally created his Patowmack Canal Corporation(s), and as President of those corporations, had participated in the operation and financing. He saw internal improvement state-chartered corporations not only as agencies intended to access the hinterland interior, promote settlement, and ensure the general prosperity and growth of the overall American economy, he also saw all that as essential to national defense and American sustained sovereignty in a hostile and competitive global world order.
On top of that Washington had, of necessity, turned to Robert Morris and his Bank of North America–the Articles of Confederation national bank–as the principal vehicle to finance the War and his Army. The southern campaign led by Nathaniel Greene was made possible only by Morris’s mechanizations with his national bank, and it was through the Bank of North America that Morris was able to offer any resources for funds to pay his soldiers and officers, and to offer bank notes to finance a future military pension upon demobilization. Whether he “liked banks” or not Washington had long left his anti-bank emotions behind. He knew instinctively, however, that most of his southern friends and neighbors had not. There can be no doubt he realized the national bank triggered deep concerns in southern states that fueled anti-Union reactions. It also was not lost to Washington that Madison, and his Secretary of State Jefferson were uncertain, if not unwilling allies concerning the national bank.
the Battle in the House of Representatives
The battle, while deep with meaning and implication, was short-lived. It started on February 2nd, and to let the cat out of the bag, ended six days later, with only twenty Representatives voting against the bank, and the overwhelming majority (39) in favor. It was after that the real fun began.
The troublemaker was again Madison. Despite his opposition in the previous Public Credit issue, most, including Hamilton thought Madison was on-board with the bank. In the Federalist Papers Madison had provided strong support to the notion of a national, i.e. federal institution that established the national primacy over states on fiscal, currency, and even public credit/debt matters. In the Federalist Papers Madison lent his support to the notion of “implied powers”–that the federal government also possessed unwritten powers to, among other things, create institutions nessary to implement the activities specified (enumerated in a section of the Constitution) in the federal sphere. It was Madison in the Constitutional Convention that had actually proposed that Congress be given powers to charter banks and other national corporations (it was rejected by the Convention BTW). But in his February 2nd lengthy speech (he talked most of the day), Madison reversed his position (seemingly) on each.
Madison spent his introduction asserting that he saw many reasons, good reasons to support the creation and operation of the national bank. It was not for him the source of all evil, the driving wedge of an unwanted capitalist system which threatened the primacy of yeoman farmers and a way of life long associated with agriculture, now threatened by manufacturing. None of that ever entered into his debate, and none of it underlie his opposition to the bank. Simply put, the core of his argument was the national bank was unconstitutional. The second concern was that it did not belong at the national level, but should devolve to the states. Madison in his arguments assumed what we today label as a “strict construction” of the powers enumerated by the Constitution, and he assumed substantially a perspective associated with today’s “states rights”, or devolution.
Explicitly, his argument squared the circle with his earlier support of “implied powers” by arguing that the national bank was “convenient” to implementing powers enumerated to the federal government by the Constitution–but were not “necessary and proper” (the wording of the Constitution)) to implementing these federal powers. There were alternatives, some of them better (leave it to the states) to implementing the enumerated federal powers. Hamilton could get what he wanted by using other structures and state regulation, rather than inserting a national bank directly into states and people’s affairs. To agree to what Hamilton proposed endorsed a definition of “implied powers” that held “implications thus remote and multiplied can be linked together‘ into a chain ‘that will reach [into] every object of legislation [he is arguing a “slippery slope”] within the whole compass of political economy’ … Congress could incorporate [charter] anything” [88} Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 293. How the several states would respond to a new National Bank was yet another concern?
The reaction to Madison’s speech–and the logic of his argument–was almost visceral. It struck at the core of the Federalist Tribe consensus–a consensus that wrote the Constitution and provided the inspiration for the the agenda of the New Republic. Madison’s fear that a loose interpretation of “implied powers” would unleash an aggressive and NONE-too-limited federal government that potentially at least would be free to use implied powers for any matter even tangentially mentioned in the Constitution. This galvanized southern fears, and coalesced them in opposition. When the final vote came, every vote in support of Madison, but one, was from a southerner. All but five votes in support of Hamilton came from the North, meaning westerner and southern support provided only five votes to the majority.
Madison did not stop passage of Hamilton’s Bank legislation. It went to Washington for his signature or veto. The President had ten days to take action (which included non-action, i.e. a pocket veto). The Bill was delivered to Washington on February 14th. By February 22nd, the President’s birthday–a day of parades, speeches and fireworks–not a peep had been heard from him. When he went to bed that night, Washington had less than 48 hours to take action, or it would be vetoed. The next day, no message was received by the Congress. On the morning of the 24th “There was general uneasiness & the President stood on the brink of a precipice from which had he fallen he would have brought down with him much of that glorious reputation he has so deservedly established’ … the bank’s partisans began venting their anger at the President, who they assumed was about to veto the bill” Madison later wrote “the meanest motives were charged on him, and the most insolent measures held over him”. [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 299.
What was going on during those ten days that “shook the Republic”?
“Ten Days That Shook the History of American Economic Development
Madison, a player in what was to follow, later recounted Washington’s mind frame and perceived situation. Washington he declared was “greatly perplexed”. It was not that he opposed the bank. Madison admits that “his belief in the utility of the establishment [of the bank] & his disposition to favor a liberal construction of national powers [loose definition of implied powers] formed a bias on one side”. From Madison we see throughout the ten days of indecision, Washington’s default position was to sign the bill. But several dynamics conflated in his mind to see in signing the bill he might cause a serious crisis–i.e. reopen the fissures unleashed by the recent Public Credit legislation and “compromise”, and generate a real sectional split. In that reopened crisis, his hot button Residence Act was likely to be threatened. More on that shortly. Secondly, the pressures he was getting from his Virginia friends and neighbors was no doubt disturbing to him personally.
That Madison, and as we shall soon discover, Jefferson were so adamant against the bank opened the possibility in his mind that he (Washington) could be wrong in his inclination. Their logic that a loose and flexible definition of implied powers created the opportunity, over time, for an expansive, not limited federal/national government could, and should not be discounted. Any loose definition of implied powers would not stop with the bank, but would inevitably be extended into other policy areas. Madison had argued with considerable conviction that a loosely defined imlied powers would allow federal power to grow “beyond all bounds and there would not be ‘a blade of grass’ which any man … could call his own” [88} Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 294. While disposed to a strong national government, Washington was no extremist on that issue; on this issue he did not share Hamilton’s optimism in a purely nationally-led federalism, but strongly wanted states to enjoy a serious and meaningful future role. Nor was he so favorably impressed by the British model that he sought to blindly copy it. A veto could compel a more thoughtful redefinition of implied powers, or a better balance between national and state powers. But using the veto generated its own issues. But a veto would almost certainly lead to an overturn of the Residence Act.
One consistent thread in Washington’s thus far modus vivendi as to how the Presidency should related to Congress, that the legislature was the dominant, if not sovereign of the three branches, and that knowing he possessed a constitutional veto he was concerned that given the large majorities in favor of the bill, that a veto not only was unsustainable, would be overturned, but that such a veto was an unwarranted insertion of executive power. He fear using the veto would generate its own sectional crisis, from the North. In other words, use of the veto was similar to an atom bomb; it likely destroyed everything he was trying to achieve.
But one argument that Madison asserted when he privately met with Washington early on, arguably bothered Washington more than any other: that Madison was correct and that the establishment of the bank was indeed unconstitutional. A bank was not a constitutionally enumerated power. As a key member of the Constitutional Convention he was aware of the division between anti-Federalists, and to use implied powers as the principal defense for its establishment was possibly a bridge too far. The matter was so divisive and yet so central to a strong national government that to rely on such a slender reed such as implied powers would mean no end of future conflict and division. In fact, as we shall see in numerous modules to follow, this was exactly what happened over the next fifty plus years. If Madison was correct that in the minds of many the bank was unconstitutional, what was needed was a constitutional fix–an amendment. Having made his fundamental argument, Madison seemingly left, thinking he had convinced Washington not to sign the legislation.
(Bordewich correctly observes, Washington did not enjoy passing the matter off to a Supreme Court. Newly formed, it lacked the capacity to even attempt to play a role. It was not until 1801 with John Marshall would be Court be a major play in constitutional matters [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 293. So Washington turned instead to his Attorney General, fellow Virginian Edmund Randolph for his opinion on the matter.)
Author of the famous “Virginia Plan” (Constitutional Convention delegate), a former aide-de-camp to Washington in the war, a Federalist who wanted a strong national government, Randolph like George Mason had nevertheless refused to sign the final Report on the Constitution, for reasons that were congruent to Washington’s anxiety–a strong central government did not preclude a strong and meaningful role for the states. Randolph offered to Washington his take on the issue: if necessary and proper phrase had any real meaning “it does not enlarge the powers of Congress, but rather restricts them” [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 294.
So Washington, naturally enough, turned to his Secretary of State Jefferson for his input. Jefferson wrote an essay which he sent to Washington. In that essay. Jefferson called attention to the still not ratified Tenth Amendment (Bill of Rights which was still wending its way through the States) which contained phrasing that clearly stipulated that all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution were reserved to the States and to the People–the famous “reserved powers”. The Constitution did, Jefferson asserted, provide implied powers to the federal government–BUT ONLY ON expressly ENUMERATED POWERS. Jefferson further advised Washington (or so he claims) that
‘To take single step beyond the boundaries specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to take possession of a boundless field of power‘ But these powers could obviously be exercised without a bank so nothing at all about it was “necessary” … the veto, he reminded Washington was the Constitution’s shield against legislative invasions and that was what they now faced [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 294.
[He continued, as cited by Thomas Fleming; asserting that if the bill were not vetoed] “the American government would soon become a mirror image of the British model, where the King and Parliament regularly chartered corporations which enriched a privileged few [99] Thomas Fleming, the Great Divide, p. 103.
Jefferson then concluded his comments with the final advice that WASHINGTON SHOULD SIGN THE NATIONAL BANK LEGISLATION!!!!
How that final advice was congruent or consistent with what he had just argued is simply unknown to me. Bordewich suggests Jefferson shared with Washington the believe that the Congress possessed the sovereign authority of the new national government, and since it had approved the bill, Washington should sign it. As we shall see, this is simply one of the many inconsistencies characteristic of Jefferson in his exercise of public power. Did he sense Washington was looking for advice that could allow him to sign the bill? Having expressed his private or personal perspective, did he then tell Washington what he perceived Washington wanted to hear?
Perhaps unbeknownst to his advisers, Washington at the very beginning of the ten day period had asked Hamilton to draft his response to legislation. “Washington sent Randolph’s and Jefferson’s written opinions to Hamilton “and asked him to reply to them”. ‘His covering letter was cold, almost curt, suggesting a loss in faith in Hamilton as an interpreter of the Constitution. Simultaneously, he sent a request to Madison to prepare a veto message–a glimpse of which way he thought the argument was going” ([99] Thomas Fleming, the Great Divide, p. 103
At noon, on the 9th day, with less than twenty-four hours left before pocket veto- with outsiders increasingly believing a veto imminent, Hamilton delivered a 40 page, 15,000 word defense of his legislation.
The core assertion, the fundamental argument he made appealed to the Federalist in Washington. Hamilton constructed was his argument that the bank be established around his loose, certainly open-ended definition of implied powers.
“The powers contained in a constitution of government, especially those which concern the general administration of the affairs of a country, its finances, trade, defense ought to be construed liberally in advancement of the public good. The means by which national exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of these means”. [He further asserted that] if Jefferson and Randolph … denied the US government the authority to create [charter] corporations … then the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a political society without sovereignty, or of a people without government”. .. Every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term a right to employ all the means requisite … to the attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society. [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, pp. 298-9.
Having received Hamilton’s Report at noon, Washington apparently deliberated on his own. His veto or approval message to Congress was due by the end of the next business day. Failure to submit any response, either a formal veto or a supporting note, would result in a pocket veto.
Through the tenth day, nothing came out of Washington’s office at his official residence. Madison than describes what happened as the end of the tenth day was just minutes away: “The time was running out, or indeed was run out; when just at this moment Lear (Washington’s private secretary) came in with the President’s sanction“. Washington did NOT veto the bill but instead sent a note indicating his support of the national bank. [88] Bordewich, the First Congress, p. 299. Washington’s die had been cast.
Why am I obsessing on Washington’s deliberation?
Because at its heart, more importantly its soul, of this deliberation was whether the federal government could or should lead in state and local economic development–and a host of other policy areas as well.
At first glance, one might take away from Washington’s decision to embrace the National Bank justifying its constitutional legitimacy on the basis of a loose definition of implied powers, as potentially paving the way for a more profound federal participation in other economic development-relevant strategies and projects–internal improvements (Patowmack Canal, for example).
It didn’t. The feds for the next thirty years would be hesitant to involve themselves in state or local economic development strategies and projects. Why?
What is being debated here is the extent to which the Feds could lead the way, that there could be a national economic development plan of some type, whether the national government could direct states and local to conduct state and local ED along federal guidelines, and whether the federal government could “finance” directly implementation of S&L programs and strategies . The future modules that I allude to so frequently will support this application of the National Bank deliberations to future economic development events. Almost shockingly, when Madison becomes President he will fall back on this line of thinking, and will demand a constitutional amendment to support federal action/direct federal resources to support state and local economic development (internal improvements–canals, ports, and roads) before he would authorize the federal government to participate in these projects. I will later argue, I believe with considerable justification, that Madison’s position, largely followed by Monroe and J.Q. Adams doomed the success of Henry Clay’s aggressive use of national government resources and direction–in particular a ED plan–to lead states and local government in their economic development-related initiatives. What we are seeing in the tenor of Washington’s deliberations on the National Bank was the philosophical nexus that justified a limited federal role in state and local ED–a role that was not fundamentally altered until FDR and his support of his defined urban renewal in 1935-6.
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison remained violently opposed to the bank. As Fleming sees it the two saw it as an institution designed to enrich the wealthy–and warned that it was tempting Americans to risk their money and peace of mind in what Jefferson called”an appetite for gambling”, Madison described the welcome that the bank received [upon its passage] “as a mere scramble for public plunder“. [99] Thomas Fleming, the Great Divide, p. 104 But here I depart from Fleming. Not only was the national bank of more profound concern than simple wealthy elite stock speculation, but its passage marked a turning point in the evolution of the Federalist Tribe, and more profoundly for the politics and the policy systems of the future American federal, state and local communities. From this point on, American political and policy life would travel on no less than two paths.
A Final Reaction to the Creation of the National Bank
In 1792 nine state-chartered banks were approved, including three south of the Mason-Dixon line (Alexandria Virginia, Richmond Virginia, and Charleston South Carolina). New England housed the other six. Before 1796, the end of Washington’s two administrations, another ten state-chartered banks were approved: none in the South (Bank of Baltimore is above the Mason-Dixon line, and Bank of Columbia in Washington D.C. itself). Two additional state-chartered banks were approved during the Adam’s administration (Portland Maine and New York City). In all this post-1791 flurry, only one state-chartered bank was approved in New York–shortly to become the finance capital of America. In any case by 1800 twenty-nine state-chartered banks were in operation, disposing of $50 million in capital [5].
As one might expect, motivation for these state banks varied by the state. In general, he states were grouped into two categories: those who wanted to emulate the National Bank and secure its economic blessings for their state, and those that established a Bank to defend themselves against the National Bank and its various branch offices established in the various states. In Virginia, (1792) Governor Henry Lee fell into the latter camp–incurring the wrath of Jefferson and Madison for doing so.Jefferson, writing to Madison on the very same day as his September 1792 breakfast with Washington wrote [warning to the reader: Jefferson is referring to the U.S. Congress as “the foreign legislature“:
For any person [the Virginia Governor Henry Lee] to recognize a foreign legislature in a case [policy area] belonging to the State itself is an act of treason. And whosoever shall do any act under color of the authority of the foreign legislature–whether by signing notes [bonds], issuing or passing them, acting as director, cashier or any other office relating to it, shall be adjudged guilty of high treason and suffer death accordingly by the judgment of the state courts“. [Fleming concludes with the observation that this passage in the letter to Madison] “was a fiery articulation of states’ rights“. Perhaps Jefferson Davis could not have said it better? [99]Thomas Fleming, the Great Divide, p.300.
In any case, at least in Jefferson’s mind the National Bank was by 1792 an intensely partisan issue in state politics, and in state and federal elections thereafter.
If Fleming is correct, and his position does not depart from my research on the reaction of southern states to the National Bank, the reader might be sensitive to the possibility that despite the diffuse of state banks after the creation of the National Bank–and the subsequent rise of private (state-chartered) privately-operated commercial banks in the subsequent decades, potentially contains implications that extend beyond the purely economic. The National Bank certainly did not “cause” the rise of states’ rights in various sections of the nation, but it certainly fueled the salience of those motivations that underlie the assertion of a state’s states’ rights.
During the 1790’s (and after for that matter) partisan politics–and corruption–became associated with state-chartered banks–revealing yet another endearing character of our ED policy-making–were themselves destined to be actors, participants, and targets in the policy-making process. Urban renewal agencies were not the first EDO by far that many detested and which were arenas in which the distinction between politics (partisan and business) and economic development was blurred indeed:
Because early banks were lucrative, politicians and opposing interest groups fought each other bitterly over charters. Rival commercial factions sought to establish the first bank in emerging commercial centers while rival political parties struggled to gain credit for establishing new banking facilities. Politicians soon discovered that they could extract overt bonuses, taxes, and illegal bribes from bank charter applicants [6].
Little known today, Hamilton’s First National Bank expired in 1811, when Democratic-Republican Vice-President George Clinton voted not to extend its national charter after its twenty year term had expired, and a tied Senate vote created the opportunity for Clinton to terminate a bank his political party did not want in the first place. BTW The National Bank Jackson terminated in 1837 was the Second National Bank, established in 1816. Between 1811 and 1816 there was no National Bank. The national bank was never not controversial. One way or another, its controversy infected S&L politics and MED.
Madison/Jefferson’s position on the national bank at one level argued that organizational structure of the national bank was for them a bridge too far–and that is one important reason this issue is critical to economic developers. That structure in question (the national-chartered corporation) was to become a controversial federal EDO, and oft-times that concern permeated into state/local chartered EDOs–the primary EDO of American External MED, and the DTIS strategy in particular [3]. Madison proved correct in his concerns. Approval of the First National Bank in 1791 opened the floodgates for S&L DTIS initiatives. In the States, expressed in a flurry of state banks authorized after 1792 [4].
[3] Robert E. Wright, Origins of Commercial Banking in the United States, 1781-1830, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/origins-of-commercial-banking-in-the-united-states-1781-1830/.
[4] Robert E. Wright, Origins of Commercial Banking in the United States, 1781-1830, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/origins-of-commercial-banking-in-the-united-states-1781-1830/.
[5] Robert E. Wright, Origins of Commercial Banking in the United States, 1781-1830, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/origins-of-commercial-banking-in-the-united-states-1781-1830/.
[6] Robert E. Wright, Origins of Commercial Banking in the United States, 1781-1830, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/origins-of-commercial-banking-in-the-united-states-1781-1830/.